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Introduction 
The widespread implementation of 
Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) 
has confronted coastal states with sev­
eral resource management problems. 
One of these consists of the economic 
relations, if any, that the coastal state 
should establish with distant-water 
fishing nations (DWFN's) seeking 
access to the coastal state's 200-mile 
zone. 
Several of the other papers pre­
sented here deal with specific aspects 
of the issue. This paper, on the other 
hand, will concern itself with the ques­
tion of the analytical framework to be 
used by economists in studying this 
issue. It will offer some suggestions 
with respect to possible components of 
the framework. 
In doing so, the paper will restrict 
itself to the coastal state's perspective 
of EFJ and the management issues 
arising therefrom. It goes without say­
ing, of course, that an enlightened 
coastal state will attempt to acquaint 
itself with the DWFN view of the 
world. 
Coastal State Obligations 
and Coastal State 
Beneficiaries Under EFJ 
Before one can discuss appropriate 
analytical frameworks, it is necessary 
to deal with two prior questions. The 
first is concerned with the obligations 
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of coastal states to DWFN's under the 
U. N. Law of the Sea Convention and 
the significance of these obligations. 
The second is concerned with the des­
ignated beneficiaries of EFJ within the 
coastal state I . 
With regard to the first question, the 
Law of the Sea Convention, which 
arose from the U. N. Third Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, has yet to be 
signed, let alone ratified, by several 
important maritime nations. The Con­
vention may never achieve the status 
of international treaty law. Nonethe­
less, it now seems to be generally 
accepted that Part V of the Convention 
on the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(United Nations, 1982) has achieved 
the status of customary international 
law (Fleischer, 1984) and has come to 
provide most, if not all, of the "rules 
of the game" under EFJ. Even the 
United States, the most prominent of 
the nonsigners of the Convention, has 
accepted the concept of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ)2 Hence, when 
one considers coastal state obligations 
to DWFN's, as set forth in the Con­
vention, there is little question as to 
the significance of these obligations. 
Within Part V of the Convention, 
the articles of greatest relevance to the 
coastal state-DWFN issue are Articles 
56, 61, 62, 63 and 64. The first three 
are of prime importance. 
Article 56 accords_ the coastal state 
"sovereign rights for the purpose of 
'To use some of the economist's jargon, when 
we consider relevant coastal-state fisheries and 
the economic benefits flowing therefrom, we 
must ask whose objective functional is to be 
maximized through time. 
2A Presidential proclamation in March 1983 an­
nounced the adherence of the United States to 
the EEZ concept. 
exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing..." living (as well as 
nonliving) resources within the state's 
EEZ (United Nations, 1982). As such, 
the Article, to all intents and purposes, 
grants the coastal state property rights 
over the fishery resources within its 
200-mile zone. The one possible ex­
ception consists of the highly migra­
tory species (i.e., tunas), about which 
there has been great controversy. This 
will be commented on later. 
An apparent major qualification to 
the coastal state's fishery property 
rights, a qualification of direct rele­
vance to coastal state obligations to 
DWFN's, is to be found in Article 62. 
Article 62 contains the "surplus prin­
ciple," which can be stated briefly as 
follows. For each fishery within its 
200-mile zone, the coastal state is to 
determine its harvesting capacity in re­
lation to the total allowable catch 
(TAC) set for the fishery. Where the 
harvesting capacity falls short of the 
TAC, a surplus is deemed to exist. 
Article 62 calls upon the coastal state 
to give "other states" (DWFN's in par­
ticular) access to the surplus (United 
Nations, 1982). 
I have argued many times (e.g., 
Munro, 1985a) that, from an economic 
standpoint at least, the surplus prin­
ciple is largely empty. Under Article 
61, the coastal state is given unambig­
uous power to set the TAC' s for the 
relevant fisheries. Hence, there is no 
legal reason why a coastal state could 
not eliminate surpluses through adjust­
ments of the TAC's.3 More impor­
'It is true that, if the coastal state sets TAC's 
which the international community deems to be 
outrageously low, the coastal state may well 
encounter severe enforcement difficulties. 
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tantly, Article 62 gives the coastal 
state very broad powers in imposing 
terms and conditions of access upon 
those states seeking access to the "sur­
pluses." In no sense whatsoever is the 
coastal state expected to give DWFN's 
free access to the "surpluses." Indeed, 
with a modest amount of imagination, 
a coastal state could impose a set of 
terms and conditions that would dis­
courage all DWFN's seeking access to 
the aforementioned surpluses. 4 
Article 62 does call upon coastal 
states wishing to remove DWFN fleets 
from their zones to allow for a phase­
out period to avoid undue dislocation 
to the DWFN's. Beyond that, how­
ever, it is difficult not to accept the 
following conclusion of William 
Burke of the University of Washington 
and specialist on the Law of the Sea: 
"... the coastal state is given substan­
tially complete discretion to manage 
the fisheries for its own exclusive 
interests, however, narrowly and sel­
fishly conceived they might be" 
(Burke, 1983: 46). 
The one disputed exception to 
coastal state property rights, highly 
migratory species, is covered by Arti­
cles 63 and 64. Coastal states are ad­
monished to cooperate with neighbor­
ing coastal states and with DWFN's, 
where appropriate, in the conservation 
of these resources. One DWFN, the 
United States, pressed the need for 
cooperation to the point of arguing that 
coastal states should not have manage­
ment control over, let alone property 
rights to, highly migratory species. 
Rather, such resources should be seen 
as international common property that 
properly should be managed by inter­
national bodies having full DWFN 
participation. 
This position led the United States 
into conflict with the Pacific Island 
Nations, a conflict which was eventu­
ally resolved through treaty negotia­
'Article 300 of the Convention, the "Good Faith 
and Abuse of Rights" article, does, according to 
many legal authorities, imply that the coastal 
cannot impose terms and conditions of access 
which are clearly designed to deny DWFN's 
access (Burke, 1983). Imaginatively designed 
terms and conditions, of course, could effec­
tively bar DWFN's without giving them a basis 
upon which to invoke Article 300. 
tions. A treaty was signed in April 
1987, and at the time of writing awaits 
ratification. The outlook for ratifica­
tion is excellent. 
Though not a lawyer, I would argue 
that, by signing the treaty, the United 
States has gone a very long way in 
conceding that coastal states do indeed 
have property rights to highly migra­
tory species. While the treaty provi­
sions apply only to U. S. fisheries rela­
tions with a limited number of coastal 
states, it is difficult to believe that 
these provisions will not in time in­
fluence American relations with all 
coastal states having highly migratory 
species that pass through their EEZ's. 
Thus, coastal state property rights to 
fishery resources can be seen as being 
more or less complete. Hence we con­
clude that the "surplus principle" is 
largely devoid of economic content. 
From this it follows that, if there is to 
be a DWFN presence in a given 
coastal state's EEZ over the long run, 
it will be because it is in the selfish 
interest of the coastal state for there to 
be such a presence. 
To determine whether it will be in 
the selfish interest of the coastal state 
for there to be a DWFN presence in its 
zone, we must answer the second prior 
question, namely, "Whose benefits 
from the relevant fisheries are to be 
maximized through time?" The ob­
vious response is that the coastal state 
will simply maximize its own benefits 
from the relevant fisheries. 
Such a response is inadequate, not 
because the coastal state should be 
concerned with the needs of others, 
but rather because the response is too 
vague. Should the response be taken to 
mean that the benefits of the nation as 
a whole from the fisheries are to be 
maximized? Or does the response 
really mean that the benefits of the 
fishing regions of the country are to be 
maximized? Alternatively, is the real 
concern with the benefits of the do­
mestic fishing industry from the fisher­
ies? If the fishing industry benefits are 
to be maximized, then should the har­
vesting or processing sector be 
favored? 
Until this set of questions is dealt 
with, it is not really possible to analyze 
sensibly the issue of coastal state­
DWFN economic relations. There is, 
for example, no guarantee whatsoever 
that policies designed to maximize the 
returns from the relevant fisheries to 
the domestic fishing industry will also 
maximize the returns from these fish­
eries to the nation as a whole. 
If the question of the object of 
fisheries management is left unre­
solved, policies pertaining to the 
coastal state's economic relations with 
DWFN's are likely to be confused, if 
not destructive. 
Most coastal states, of which I am 
aware, claim that their objective in 
managing fisheries within their EEZ's 
is to maximize the national benefits 
from these fisheries through time. It 
shall, therefore, be assumed in the dis­
cussion to follow that the coastal 
state's fisheries management objective 
is in fact that of maximizing the flow 
of national benefits from the fisheries. 
As a first approximation, we can 
measure these benefits in terms of net 
contributions to the coastal state's na­
tional income. 
It needs to be stressed, however, 
that if the real objective of fisheries 
management is other than that of max­
imizing the national benefits from the 
fisheries, what follows may require 
drastic modification. 
Potential Benefits of Long-Term 
Coastal State-DWFN Arrangements 
and Infant Industries 
We come now to consider the po­
tential benefits to a coastal state 
from long-term arrangements with 
DWFN's, stressing the adjectives "po­
tential" and "long-term." If we are 
concerned only with short-term, essen­
tially phase out, types of arrange­
ments, the interest provided by the 
arrangements is extremely limited. Po­
tential is emphasized because if the 
benefits are positive, there is no assur­
ance that they will be realized. Such 
benefits can easily be dissipated 
through poorly constructed sets of ac­
cess terms and conditions. Later I dis­
cuss the question of access terms and 
conditions. 
It is not too great an exaggeration to 
say that, at the dawn of EFJ, the gen-
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eral view among coastal states was that 
the benefits to them of a long-term 
DWFN presence in their zones were 
seen to be nonexistent, if not negative. 
It seemed obvious that, if a coastal 
state were to capture the full economic 
benefits from its EEZ, it should 
remove DWFN fleets from 200-mile 
zone with all possible speed and re­
place their activities with domestic 
harvesting and processing. 
While this view is still prevalent, we 
do now have cases in which coastal 
states are making explicit references to 
long-term arrangements with DWFN's 
or are prepared to concede that such 
long-term arrangements are a distinct 
possibility. I have argued on several 
occasions that there are sound eco­
nomic reasons why such long-term ar­
rangements might be considered, 
reasons which can be derived from an 
application of rather elementary inter­
national economics (Munro, 1981, 
1985a, b). The tools of international 
economics also prove to be very useful 
in analyzing the arguments against 
such long-term arrangements. I shall 
review the earlier applications of inter­
national economics to coastal state­
DWFN arrangements and introduce 
some important qualifications and 
additions ignored in the earlier treat­
ments. 
During the Second International In­
stitute of Fisheries Economics and 
Trade Conference, New Zealand econ­
omists, Kerr and Sharp (1985:268) 
wrote that "Co-operative agreements 
provide coastal states with an oppor­
tunity for developing their exclusive 
economic zones, and foreign partners 
with an opportunity to utilize a re­
source. The advantages of such co­
operation may be found in differences 
that exist between the partners with 
respect to endowments of: information 
... technique, capital ... natural 
resources. " 
If we were to restate this argument 
in the language of international eco­
nomics, we would say that such co­
operative arrangements may make 
economic sense for a coastal state be­
cause the DWFN('s) possess a com­
parative advantage in the provison of 
certain harvesting and/or processing 
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services. 
One can think of the coastal state 
"hiring" DWFN's to provide harvest­
ing/processing services, or alterna­
tively, one can think of the coastal 
state "importing" such DWFN ser­
vices. Expressed in this fashion, the 
argument on behalf of long-term 
coastal state-DWFN arrangements, as 
seen from the coastal state perspective, 
is simply a variant of the argument for 
free trade. 
Thus, suppose that in a particular 
fishery within a coastal state's EEZ, 
DWFN's possess a comparative ad­
vantage in harvesting the resource 
vis-a-vis domestic harvesters. A free 
trade type of argument would state that 
the coastal state should avail itself of 
the cheaper DWFN harvesting ser­
vices. The argument would continue 
that by so doing the coastal state would 
enhance the fishery's contribution to 
its national income. Whether such an 
arrangement should be of short or long 
term would depend upon whether the 
comparative advantage of the DWFN 
proves to be of short or long term. 
If the DWFN's possess a compara­
tive advantage in processing, rather 
than harvesting, the argument is less 
obvious. Nonetheless, it does not re­
quire much skill as an economist to 
demonstrate the argument's validity in 
this case. One can indeed maintain that 
the fishery's contribution to the coastal 
state's national income will be en­
hanced if the coastal state avails itself 
of the DWFN's processing services. 
It can further be maintained that 
comparative advantage should as well 
dictate the structure of the coastal 
state-DWFN arrangement. At one ex­
treme, the DWFN's might exhibit a 
comparative disadvantage in the pro­
vision of all relevant harvesting and 
processing services. Then there should 
be no arrangements with DWFN's 
based on the fishery in question. 
At the other extreme, DWFN's may 
possess a comparative advantage in all 
aspects of harvesting/processing, in 
which case a "fee" fishing type of 
arrangement would be appropriate. 
The DWFN fleets would both harvest 
the resource and process the catch in 
return for a "fee" (e.g., a tax on catch 
or on effort). Between those extremes, 
it might be found that comparative ad­
vantage dictated a joint venture type of 
arrangement in which some of the har­
vesting/processing services would be 
provided by the DWFN fleets and part 
by coastal state entities. 
Many factors can give rise to 
DWFN comparative advantages. No 
attempt will be made to discuss them 
here as they are analyzed in detail else­
where (e.g., Munro, 1985a). Ex­
amples are relative factor endowments 
or seasonality conditions. 
In my previous papers on this topic, 
the unfortunate impression was created 
that the dictates of comparative advan­
tage will lead to an either/or result. 
That is, comparative advantage would 
result in a particular harvesting or pro­
cessing activity being carried out ex­
clusively by domestic entities or ex­
clusively by DWFN fleets. 
This is the equivalent of complete 
specialization in international eco­
nomics. Every student of this branch 
of economics is taught that, while 
complete specialization is possible and 
observable, it is not the usual out­
come. More commonly, as specializa­
tion begins to take place, relative 
foreign and domestic cost change with 
the consequence that incomplete spe­
cialization occurs. 
A particular country may have a 
clear comparative disadvantage in the 
production of commodity X. Nonethe­
less, it might be found that if the 
country permitted the unhindered im­
portation of commodity X, then the 
country would still have a small, but 
entirely viable, X industry. 
In the context of fisheries, incom­
plete specialization could be illustrated 
as follows. In a particular fishery 
within a coastal state's EEZ it is found 
that the DWFN's have an unequivocal 
comparative advantage in the pro­
vision of all harvesting and processing 
services. The coastal state places no 
hindrances on the establishment of 
cooperative arrangements with the 
DWFN's. Nonetheless, there emerges 
over time a small, but fully competi­
tive, domestic industry based on the 
fishery and engaged in both harvesting 
and processing operations. Optimal 
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policy would result in the balance be­
tween domestic and DWFN operations 
being such that the fishery's contribu­
tion to the coastal state's national 
income was maximized. 
An example is provided by the 
Pacific Island Nations. Small domestic 
tuna industries exist. It is anticipated 
that such domestic industries will ex­
pand and multiply over time. Yet it is 
also anticipated that DWFN's will play 
a major role in the Island Nations' tuna 
fisheries for a very long time indeed 
(Clark, 1985). 
The arguments on behalf of long­
term arrangements with DWFN's are 
straightforward. Those against, on the 
other hand, are complex and the 
source of considerable controversy. 
There is no controversy, let it be 
noted, however, in those instances in 
which harvesting/processing compara­
tive advantages clearly lie with the 
coastal state. There would then be gen­
eral agreement within the coastal state 
that no arrangements with DWFN's, 
other than phase-out arrangements, 
would be justifiable. 
Rather, controversy arises in those 
instances in which the comparative 
advantage in harvesting and/or pro­
cessing clearly lies with the DWFN(s). 
In such instances, the arguments 
against long-term arrangements with 
DWFN's are, upon inspection, seen to 
be really arguments for the protection 
of the domestic harvesting or process­
ing sector. Thus, the controversy 
which arises can be seen as a free trade 
vs. protection argument. The rele­
vance of international economics to an 
analysis of the controversy is obvious. 
I might note in passing that the in­
struments of protection seldom, if 
ever, take the textbook form of tariffs 
and quotas. Rather, the protection is to 
be found in the terms and conditions of 
access. An example, would be the dis­
criminatory harvest allocation system 
employed both in Canada and the 
United States. 5 
'The allocation system. about which more will 
be said later, operates as follows: A TAC is set 
for a particular fishery. Wholly domestic opera­
tions have first call upon the TAC. If there is a 
residual, joint-venture operations then have a 
claim. If there is still a residual. it is allocated to 
wholly DWFN operations. 
As is noted in every standard text in 
international economics, the argument 
for free trade is essentially a global 
argument. Free trade, it is alleged, will 
lead to an optimal allocation of world 
resources from which all stand to 
benefit. Most trade economists will 
concede, however, that limited protec­
tion may benefit individual countries. 
Since our concern is with individual 
coastal states, not the world at large, 
the arguments for protecting domestic 
harvesters and processors cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. 
The aforementioned economists, 
who concede that protection may be 
valid from the perspective of an indi­
vidual country, proceed to divide the 
arguments for protection into two cate­
gories: Legitimate and illegitimate. 
The test of legitimacy lies in whether 
the protection being prescri bed will 
lead to an enhancement of the coun­
try's national income. Illegitimate 
arguments for protection, if accepted, 
may well result in certain industries, 
groups, or regions benefiting. The 
benefits of protection will, however, 
come at the expense of the rest of the 
country. 
So called illegitimate arguments for 
protection, while being rejected by 
most economists, often have immense 
political appeal. This is no less true in 
the area of fisheries and EFJ than it is 
in ordinary commodity trade. Let one 
example suffice. For want of a better 
term, I shall refer to the argument as 
the "value added" argument. 
As a first approximation, the contri­
bution of a domestic industry to the 
country's national income is equal to 
its value added. 6 Now suppose that a 
country both produces and imports 
commodity Y. The domestic pro­
ducers of Y argue for protection on the 
grounds that, if imports are curbed, the 
domestic Y industry's value added will 
expand. Thus the industry's contribu­
tion to the national income will be in­
creased. Without protection, value 
added will continue to be lost to 
foreigners. 
"Value added can be measured by summing the 
industry's profits and its payments to the owners 
of "primary" inputs (e.g. labor. capital. natural 
resources) employed by the industry. 
In the context of fisheries and EFJ, 
the argument tends to appear in the 
following fashion. If the existing 
DWFN fleets operating in the EEZ are 
forced out by appropriate access terms 
and conditions, they will be replaced 
by domestic harvestors/processors. 
Thus the domestic fishing industry's 
value added and the industry's contri­
bution to the national income will in­
crease. If the foreigners are permitted 
to continue unhindered, value added 
will go on being lost to the foreigners.? 
The flaw in the argument is easy to 
detect and should be obvious to any 
competent student in a principles 
course in economics. If the domestic 
industry in question is protected, its 
value added per period of time can 
indeed be expected to increase. How­
ever, the labor, capital, and natural 
resources giving rise to this increased 
value added will be drawn from other 
activities in the economy. 8 Hence 
value added in other parts of the econ­
omy will fall. The net contribution of 
protection to national income could 
well be negative. 
Of the legitimate arguments for pro­
tection, the one with greatest relevance 
to the coastal state-DWFN arrange­
ment debate is also the most famous of 
such arguments. It is the infant indus­
try argument, which is in reality an 
argument for temporary protection. It 
rests upon the premise that the country 
has a latent comparative advantage in a 
particular activity. 
The argument runs that, while the 
country has a latent comparative ad­
vantage in the activity, newly estab­
lished domestic firnls attempting to ex­
ploit the advantage cannot survive in 
7A related arugment arising in the case of "fee" 
fishing runs as follows. DWFN's pay the coastal 
state an amount equal to some small percentage 
of the gross commercial value of the catch, say 5 
percent. If the DWFN's were replaced by do­
mestic harvesters and processors, 100 percent, 
rather than 5 percent, of the benefits would ac­
crue to the coastal state. Presumably what the 
supporters of the argument have in mind is that 
the full value added will be captured by the 
coastal state, rather than the DWFN's. The 
value added is, of course. significantly less than 
100 percent of the gross commercial value of the 
catch. 
"Unless these inputs would otherwise have been 
unemployed. Then the argument for protection 
would become the quasi-legitimate employment 
argument for protection. 
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the face of competitIOn from well 
established foreign rivals. The infant 
domestic firms should, therefore, be 
protected until they have gone through 
the necessary learning stage. Once the 
firms have completed this stage, they 
will be fully competitive and the 
country's comparative advantage will 
stand revealed. The walls of protection 
can then be dismantled. 
The argument is particularly rele­
vant to EFJ because EFJ has not led to 
a situation in which existing domestic 
harvesting/processing activities are 
endangered by competition from 
DWFN's. Rather it has led to a situa­
tion in which domestic harvestors/pro­
cessors wish to undertake new activ­
ities, but doubt they could survive in 
face of competition from well en­
trenched DWFN rivals. 
In previous papers (e.g., Munro, 
1985a) I have stated that the infant 
industry argument applied to coastal 
states and EFJ might run as follows: 
"Prior to E.F.J. international fish­
eries, subsequently to be encompassed 
by the [coastal] state's EEZ, held little 
or no interest to the coastal state fish­
ing industry. The fisheries may have 
required capital intensive operations 
with specialized gear/and or vessels, 
while the fisheries themselves were 
subject to non-existent or weak man­
agement. Thus the investment required 
was deemed to be excessively risky. 
The risk for distant-water nations, 
whose fleets moved throughout the 
world, was far less. 
"Now that the fisheries are under 
coastal state management, the argu­
ment continues, the fisheries are of 
much greater interest to the domestic 
industry. Domestic harvestors and/or 
processors cannot, however, compete 
unprotected against well established 
distant-water fleets. If protection for 
the coastal state industry were forth­
coming and maintained until the 
domestic fishing industry had passed 
through the learning and development 
phase, then the coastal state's compar­
ative advantage, now latent, would be 
revealed" (Munro, 1985a:9). 
Both the United States and Canada 
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provide clear examples of the applica­
tion of this argument. One such ex­
ample is provided by the groundfisher­
ies off Alaska. The fisheries have, 
since the late 1970's, been dominated 
by joint ventures in which U.S. trawl­
ers harvest the resource and deliver the 
catch to foreign processing vessels. 
There is now, however, rising interest 
in U. S. -owned processing vessels. 
Protection is demanded by the owners 
of these vessels. The infant industry 
argument is brought to bear. 
Indeed, in a statement by the Alaska 
Factory Trawler Association, it was 
maintained that" ...we are a fragile 
'infant' industry." The statement then 
went on to insist on more rigorous 
measures to remove the foreign rivals 
from the U. S. EEZ. 9 It can be asserted 
without fear of contradiction that a 
lengthy search would not be required 
to find additional infant industry 
examples among other coastal states. 
While the infant industry argument 
is certainly legitimate, there are 
counter arguments which need to be 
taken into account. The standard ones 
are that: I) It is very difficult to deter­
mine a priori which infants do in fact 
have reasonable prospects of achieving 
maturity, 2) in those instances in 
which the infants do achieve maturity, 
one still has to weigh the costs of pro­
tection against the benefits from bring­
ing the industry to maturity and 3) 
even when the infant does reach 
maturity and when the potential net 
benefits of protection prove to be posi­
tive, it becomes politically very diffi­
cult to remove the protective barriers 
once such a removal is called for. 
Thus the risk exists in applying the 
infant industry argument that the latent 
comparative advantage will prove to 
be nonexistent. The infant is either ter­
minated, often painfully, or is allowed 
to linger on-a permanent burden to 
the economy. Alternatively, the indus­
try may grow to maturity, but exert 
sufficient political pressure to maintain 
the protection indefinitely at the ex­
"Testimony of E. D. Evans, representing the 
Alaska Factory Trawler Association, cited in 
Pereyra 1986. For a discussion of the application 
of the infant industry argument in Canada see 
Munro (1985b). 
pense of the rest of the economy. 
In the case of fisheries, there is yet 
another problem with the infant indus­
try argument, which has become par­
ticularly visible in Alaska. This is the 
fact that, within a given EEZ fishery, 
there may be two "infants" to contend 
with, a harvesting sector "infant" and a 
processing sector "infant." Giving 
support to one "infant" can easily 
come at the expense at the other. Thus, 
for example, granting protection to the 
processing sector "infant" ... might 
well damage the harvesting sector 
"infant," which might achieve most 
rapid growth by being permitted to 
enter into joint ventures with foreign 
offshore processors. (Alverson, 1987, 
presents examples of where this prob­
lem has emerged.) 
There is a second legitimate argu­
ment for protection that proves to be 
relevant to fisheries and which, until 
recently, the author believed wrongly 
to have no relevance at all. This is the 
"terms of trade" argument. The argu­
ment states that by introducing barriers 
to import or export flows, a country 
may be able to shift the terms of trade 
in its favor. The argument rests criti­
cally upon the country having some 
degree of monopoly and monopsony 
power in the sale of exports and pur­
chase of import products respectively 
and rests critically as well upon the 
assurance that the country will not be 
subject to extensive retaliation by its 
trading partners. 
The application of this argument to 
fisheries, of which this author is 
aware, appears in the United States in 
the guise of the "market void theory." 
It is maintained that if DWFN fleets as 
harvesters and processors are denied 
access to the Alaskan groundfisheries, 
then a "void" will be created in foreign 
groundfish markets. The consequence 
will be that prices of U.S.-harvested 
and processed groundfish products 
will rise. The debate over this argu­
ment has focussed on the degree of 
U.S. monopoly power in this area 
(Pereyra, 1986). 
There is another aspect of protec­
tionism, outside of the arguments for 
and against protectionism, which is 
relevant, and whict{ has largely been 
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ignored in the literature. This is the 
concept of "effective," as opposed to 
nominal, protection. When a domestic 
industry is protected, the protection 
does, in fact, apply to the industry's 
value added. It, therefore, becomes 
important to know whether the costs of 
the intermediate inputs are influenced 
by protection. If such costs are greatly 
increased by protection, the "effec­
tive" protection enjoyed by the indus­
try could in fact be negative. 
Thus in the case of fisheries a 
domestic harvesting or processing sec­
tor may appear to be uncompetitive 
with respect to DWFN's only because 
the costs of intermediate inputs are 
inflated by protection. For example, 
suppose that domestic fishermen and 
offshore processors were compelled to 
purchase their vessels from heavily 
protected, high-cost domestic ship­
yards, while DWFN fleet owners were 
able to purchase their vessels on the 
world market. In assessing the degree 
of protection actually enjoyed by the 
domestic fishing industry, it would be 
essential to acknowledge the inflated 
capital costs of the industry. 
If one were asked to provide ex­
amples of protectionism under EFJ, it 
would be necessary to look no further 
than North America. Both the United 
States and Canada follow essentially 
the same policy, which is one of high 
protectionism. In both countries, pro­
tectionism appears, as indicated ear­
lier, through the harvest allocation sys­
tem. First preference is given to opera­
tions involving domestic harvesting 
and processing, second preference to 
joint ventures, and last preference to 
foreign "fee" fishing. 
Off Canada's Atlantic coast, where 
most of Canada's gains from EFJ lie, 
DWFN participation in Canada's EEZ 
fisheries has steadily dwindled and in 
time will likely approach zero. In the 
groundfisheries off Alaska, foreign 
"fee" fishing, or directed fishing, de­
clined rapidly to be replaced by joint 
ventures (Pereyra, 1986). Reference 
has been made to the increasing inter­
est in U. S. owned and operated factory 
trawlers. It is now being argued that 
this interest may well lead to the phas­
ing out of joint ventures within a 
decade (Alverson, 1987). 
While it is easy to find examples of 
protectionism in coastal state-DWFN 
relations, it is more of a challenge to 
find cases in which something ap­
proaching a free trade policy is 
adopted. No coastal state, of course, 
follows a pure "free trade" policy. 
Nonetheless, while the search is 
challenging, examples can be found. 
There is one case which we have al­
ready raised, the Pacific Island Na­
tions which collectively lay claim to 
high-valued and immense tuna re­
sources. While some of the Island Na­
tions have infant tuna industries, 
which they intend to foster, it also re­
mains true that they have established, 
with formidable skill, long-term agree­
ments with DWFN's (Clark, 1985). It 
is also clear that their stated object of 
management is clearly that of maxi­
mizing national benefits from the 
fisheries (Kotobalavu, 1987). 
It can be argued that the Pacific 
Island Nations have little choice, be­
cause they lack and can expect to lack, 
the capital to exploit fully their tuna 
fisheries. This can be debated. The 
second example, however, is one in 
which the coastal state clearly could in 
time exploit the relevant fisheries with 
fully domestic harvesting and process­
ing operations if it so desired. The 
example is New Zealand. 
New Zealand instituted an EEZ in 
1978. The most important species 
acquired were demersal species such 
as the high valued orange roughy. 
After several years of experimentation 
and uncertainty with respect to long­
term fisheries policy, there was imple­
mented in 1982 a deep-water trawl 
policy based on individual transferable 
company quotas. 
Companies acquiring these quotas 
are required to have 35 percent of the 
harvests arising form these quotas pro­
cessed in New Zealand. Beyond this, 
however, the companies can exploit 
the quotas as they see fit. If a company 
chooses to employ its domestic har­
vesting vessels and processing capac­
ity, it may do so. If it chooses to em­
ploy foreign vessels through charter 
for harvesting and/or processing, it 
may also do so. The only restrictions 
are that charter fees are to be expressed 
in cash rather than kind and that prices 
received from foreign vessels are to be 
realistic market prices (Major, 1985; 
Clark and Duncan 10). 
The advantages of the scheme were 
and are, first, that aside from the 35 
percent rule, it gives comparative ad­
vantage full reign. Secondly, the 
scheme is such that, once in place, it 
proved to be highly acceptable to the 
industry. Under this approach, the 
company quota holder which follows 
the dictates of comparative advantage 
enjoys higher profits. 
It should be added in passing that 
part of the resource rent is garnered for 
public purse. The government enjoys 
part of the return on the fisheries 
through the income tax, but also 
through a per tonne royalty which 
varies according to species (Major, 
1985). 
Analyzing Terms and
 
Conditions of Access
 
The discussion of comparative ad­
vantage and of free trade vs. protection 
is set in terms of the potential benefits 
to coastal states from long-term ar­
rangements with DWFN's. The exis­
tence of such potential benefits pro­
vides no guarantee, however, that the 
benefits will in fact be realized. As 
suggested earlier, the potential can be 
easily lost if the terms and conditions 
of access which govern DWFN partici­
pation in the coastal state's fisheries 
are badly designed. Let two examples 
suffice. 
First, suppose that the coastal state 
enters into "fee" fishing arrangements, 
but then binds itself to a policy of col­
lecting fees only for the purpose of 
covering administrative and surveil­
lance costs. In essence, this is the 
equivalent of willfully overpaying 
foreigners for harvesting and process­
ing services. Hence, the returns to 
coastal state from the arrangements 
will be far below the potential. 
lOelark, J. N., and A. J. Duncan. 1986. New 
Zealand's fisheries management policies-past, 
present, and future: The implementation of an 
ITQ-based management system. New Zealand 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Welling­
ton, unpubl. rep. 
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Secondly, suppose that the terms and 
conditions of access tolerate, or indeed 
encourage, wholesale cheating by the 
foreign fleets. The collapse of the ar­
rangements would then be all but 
assured. 
In deciding how to analyze the de­
sign (from the coastal state's perspec­
tive) of the optimal set of terms and 
conditions of access, it is important to 
consider the nature of the relationship 
between the coastal state and its 
DWFN partner(s). When two neigh­
boring coastal states negotiate over the 
management of a shared fishery re­
source, it is reasonable to think of the 
relationship as being one that is more 
or less between equals. By way of con­
trast, when a coastal state enters into 
negotiations with a DWFN, the rela­
tionship is distinctly hierarchical in 
nature. 
Under Part V of the Law of the Sea 
Convention, the coastai state has clear 
property rights to the relevant fishery 
resources. I argued earlier that the so 
called "surplus principle" is largely 
empty and that ambiguities over highly 
migratory species are being resolved in 
the coastal states' favor. To all intents 
and purposes, the coastal state can 
grant, or refuse to grant, access rights 
to DWFN's as it sees fit. 
In discussing the potential benefits 
of coastal state-DWFN arrangements, 
I wrote in terms of the coastal state 
"importing" the harvesting/processing 
services of DWFN fleets. I said as well 
that one can just as easily talk of the 
coastal state "hiring" the DWFN fleets 
to perform harvesting/processing ser­
vices. 
[n an ideal world, as seen from the 
perspective of the coastal state, the 
DWFN "hireling" would be subject to 
the absolute control of the coastal 
state. The DWFN fleets would not 
merely refrain from poaching, they 
would follow, with precision, a har­
vesting profile through time dictated 
by the coastal state. The aforemen­
tioned terms and conditions would be 
orders and requirements to be followed 
and observed without question. 
The real world is, of course, never 
ideal. The coastal state cannot exercise 
perfect control over the DWFN "hire­
51(1), 1989 
lings." [n particular, it cannot exer­
cise perfect control over the DWFN's 
harvesting policies. It may be able to 
prevent DWFN fleets from harvesting 
beyond certain limits, but it cannot 
compel the fleets to increase their har­
vesting if they are underexploiting the 
resources from the coastal state's point 
of view. Perfect control over DWFN 
fleets is too difficult, or more to the 
point, too costly to achieve. Thus, the 
temlS and conditons of access should 
be viewed, not as a set of orders, but 
rather as a set of incentives designed to 
persuade the DWFN fleets to act in a 
manner which the coastal state deems 
to be satisfactory, if not optimal. 
The implication of the hierarchical 
coastal state-DWFN relationship and 
the typical coastal state's inability to 
exercise absolute control over DWFN 
fleets is that the appropriate analytical 
framework may be found in what has 
come to be known as principal-agent 
analysis. 
In such analysis, a principal is seen 
to acquire the services of an agent or 
agents. The agent performs certain 
tasks that will yield benefits to the 
principal. The principal finds it too 
costly to exercise absolute control over 
the agent. Rather the principal must 
content itself with establishing an in­
centive system for the agent. which 
contains within it a reward function. It 
is generally assumed that, over the 
course of the relationship, the agent 
must, if he is to perform, enjoy some 
minimum return which in tum may be 
determined by market forces or 
through bargaining. 
Once the incentive system is in 
place, the agent, will proceed to act in 
a manner to maximize its own benefits 
or gains. The principal will enjoy the 
total benefits produced by the agent's 
actions minus the benefits accruing to 
the agent. The principal's objective 
then is to choose an incentive scheme 
that will maximize its benefits, given 
that the agent has some freedom of 
action and is subject to the condition 
that the benefits accruing to the agent 
must not be less than some minimum. 
(See Clarke and Munro, 1987, for a 
description of the principal-agent para­
digm.) 
An example of the application of 
principal-agent analysis, which is 
suggestive of the fisheries case, is to 
be found in the study of sharecropping 
(e.g., Hurwicz and Shapiro, 1978). 
The landlord, as owner of the land, is 
the principal. The tenant farmers, to 
whom he grants access to his land, are 
the agents. The landlord's return from 
the land is dependent in part upon the 
abundance of crops raised by the ten­
ant farmers. The tenants have con­
siderable freedom of action. The prob­
lem faced by landlord as principal is to 
design an incentive scheme, e.g. a 
crop sharing formula, that will maxi­
mize his returns, given that the tenants 
have some freedom of action and 
given that they will not act unless they 
are guaranteed some minimum return. 
In the case of fisheries and EFJ, the 
coastal state, as owner of the resouces, 
would obviously be seen as the prin­
cipal. The DWFN's would be seen as 
the agents. The terms and conditions 
of access would constitute the incen­
tive scheme. 
One attempt to apply principal­
agent analysis to coastal state-DWFN 
relations has recently been published 
(Clarke and Munro, 1987). The paper 
is very much a first attempt and, as 
such, restricts itself to a narrow prob­
lem. The problem of surveillance and 
enforcement, which is in fact a sub­
sidiary principal-agent issue, is pushed 
into the background. Furthermore, the 
paper analyzes only "fee" fishing ar­
rangements. (However, one can 
assert with some assurance that prin­
cipal-agent analysis will apply to 
joint-venture arrangements as well.) 
The distant-water fleets harvest the 
resource and in so doing are assumed 
to produce resource rent. The coastal 
state, cum principal, is assumed to im­
pose taxes on catch and/or fishing ef­
fort. The reward to the DWFN's, cum 
agents, consists of the resource rent 
minus the taxes. 
Hence, rather than sharing of crops, 
we have a case of sharing of resource 
rent. The rent sharing formula-the 
tax system---constitutes the incentive 
scheme. While serving to garner a por­
tion of the resource rent for the prin­
cipal, the taxes serve as well to 
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influence the DWFN's harvest profile 
through time. The paper then analyzes 
the effect of different tax systems in 
light of the coastal state/principal's 
goal of maximizing its return from the 
relevant fishery through time. 
It may sound farfetched to place so 
much emphasis on tax incentives in 
coastal state-DWFN relations. Yet we 
have an example of taxes as an incen­
tive scheme from the South Pacific 
where "fee" fishing arrangements are 
prevalent. The example appears in a 
particularly useful recent article on the 
access arrangements of the largest of 
the island nations, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) (Doulman, 1987). 
PNG extracts a return from DWFN 
fleets by means of access fees. Doul­
man (1987: 19) stated that "By defini­
tion access fees are a tax which are 
essentially designed to extract the 
resource rent from the fishery; foster 
operational efficiency in the use of the 
resource; and provide an instrument 
for government to regulate, develop, 
conserve and generally manage the 
fishery." (See also Clark, 1985:25­
26.) The article then goes on to ana­
lyze the operation of this tax/incentive 
scheme in detail. 
While it may not in fact be un­
reasonable to emphasize the use of 
taxes as an incentive scheme, the 
paper by Clarke and Munro (1987) is 
no more than the first step in applying 
principal agent analysis to terms and 
conditions of EEZ access. The paper 
leaves important aspects of "fee" 
fishing arrangements unexplored. It 
says nothing about joint venture ar­
rangements and pushes into the back­
ground the important surveillance and 
enforcement problem. What the paper 
does do, however, is to suggest that 
principal-agent analysis may be a fruit­
ful approach to studying coastal state­
DWFN economic relations. 
Conclusions 
In this paper I have been concerned 
with means of analyzing coastal state­
DWFN economic relations, as seen 
from the perspective of coastal states. 
The fundamental premise has been 
that, under the rules laid down by the 
Law of the Sea Convention, the 
coastal state need establish long-term 
arrangements with DWFN's only if it 
is the coastal state's selfish interests to 
do so. I then argued that the economics 
of international trade provides ana­
lytical tools that are useful in deter­
mining whether, in fact, it is in the 
selfish interest of a coastal state to 
establish the aforementioned arrange­
ments. 
If there is reason to believe that a 
long-term arrangement with one or 
more DWFN's could be potentially 
beneficial for a coastal state, one then 
requires means of analyzing from an 
economic perspective the mix of ac­
cess terms and conditions open to the 
coastal state. I then argued that a fruit­
ful approach to this question lies in the 
application of principal-agent analysis. 
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